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Autocracies and Economic Development: 
Theory and Evidence from 20th Century Mexico 
Jörg Faust ∗ 
Abstract: »Autokratien und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung: 
Mexiko im 20. Jahrhundert«. On average, higher levels of 
democracy positively effect economic performance. Still, 
many autocratic regimes experienced remarkable economic 
growth. Thus, one should differentiate between autocracies 
to identify the sources of varying economic success under 
autocratic rule. Mexico’s history during the last century 
provides fruitful empirical evidence on how different kinds 
of autocracies impact on economic development. Dividing 
political order in twentieth century Mexico into several pe-
riods of autocratic rule shows that economically successful 
autocratic regimes were partly able to mimic core institu-
tional features of democracies. The variance of autocratic 
order in Mexico suggests that autocratic regimes character-
ized by relatively broad societal coalitions and the existence 
of institutional arrangements that regulate political succes-
sion outperform other arrangements of autocratic rule. 
1. Introduction 
During the last decades, democratization processes in several regions have 
driven research towards the analysis of different types of emerging democra-
cies and the potential economic impacts of varying forms of democratization. 
However, the analysis of autocratic regimes is again becoming en vogue among 
social scientists – mostly because of the normatively frustrating evidence that 
despite of the end of the Cold War, autocratic order is still a widespread phe-
nomenon.1 
                                                 
∗  Address all communications to: Jörg Faust, German Development Institute D.I.E., Tulpen-
feld 6, 53113 Bonn, Germany; e-mail: joerg.faust@die-gdi.de; URL: www.die-gdi.de. 
1  For recent studies on the persistence of autocratic regimes see, among others Albrecht/ 
Schlumberger (2004), Mesquita/Downs (2005) and Brownlee (2007). 
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Given this background, the article attempts to provide some clarification for 
a puzzle among social scientists. On the one hand, mounting empirical evi-
dence supports the argument that higher levels of democracy provoke an eco-
nomic dividend. On the other hand, this evidence is confronted with the fact 
that several autocracies have achieved impressing economic progress. Conse-
quently, there is need for explanations, which clarify why democracies provide 
– on average – an economic dividend, while at the same time explaining eco-
nomic progress in some autocracies. As such, analyzing historic evidence of 
autocratic regimes can be a fruitful undertaking not only for historians inter-
ested in the specific course of long-ago developments in their societies of 
choice but also for those working on the economic effects of more current poli-
tical phenomena. 
Driven by a theoretical perspective, this article attempts to link periods of 
economic boom and downturn to the variance of autocratic order in twentieth 
century Mexico. Mexico is an especially interesting case for exploring the 
varying economic impact of different autocratic regimes. Mexico’s economic 
development during the last century has been characterized by periods of amaz-
ing growth but also by times of turmoil and crisis. After its first long term 
growth period under the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911), the Mexican 
Revolution and its prolonged aftermath seriously constrained the potential of 
Mexican economic development. Hereafter, the consolidation of the one-party-
dominant regime of the Partido Revolucionario Institucionalizado (PRI) since 
the late 1930s came along with the so-called Mexican economic miracle. This 
period, which was prolonged artificially by the industrial countries’ oil crisis in 
the 1970s, ended in 1982, when Mexico experienced a severe debt crisis. The 
latter not only required substantial attempts of structural adjustments towards 
more market-oriented policies but also resulted in the acceleration of the PRI-
regime’s political decline. Despite economic reforms, the PRI-regime did not 
manage to accelerate economic growth in the 1980s and the early 1990s. In-
stead, it provoked an additional economic respectively financial crisis in 1994, 
which erased much of its remaining political legitimacy and gave way to the 
first democratic elections in 1994 and the subsequent defeat of the PRI in the 
presidential elections in 2000. 
Noticeably, the above-mentioned variance of economic performance in 
twentieth century Mexican took place under autocratic rule. Autocracy has 
been the dominant feature of political order in Mexico. However, autocratic 
order in Mexico did not consist in a unified set of political arrangements. In-
stead, Mexican autocracies in the past century differed substantially. From the 
dictatorship during the Porfiriato (1876-1911) and the subsequent turbulent 
regimes of revolutionary generals to different coalitions under the long-lasting 
regime of the PRI: autocratic regimes in Mexico were based on different types 
of coalitions and institutional arrangements. This variance of autocratic order 
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within the same cultural and geographic setting facilitates the analysis of eco-
nomic development under different autocratic settings. 
The next section (2.1) starts with providing a short review on research re-
garding political institutions’ impact on economic development and discusses 
the different economic consequences of autocratic and democratic order. On 
average, democracies provide an economic dividend because of two reasons. 
First, their institutional design is characterized by inclusive and competitive 
participation, which drives politicians towards the more encompassing interests 
of society. The institutional design of democracy limits the tension between the 
individual rationality of rulers and the collective rationality of encompassing 
majorities (Olson 1993). Thus, democracies, on average, provide more collec-
tive goods spurring economic progress than autocracies, which are based on an 
exclusive ruling coalition able to exploit the majority in order to provide a 
minority with privileges. Second, democracies contain an institutional arrange-
ment that substantially smoothens the tension between political succession and 
institutional stability. For that reason, in comparison to autocracies, democra-
cies are less confronted with economic insecurity and the risk of economic 
downturns in periods of political succession. 
After having laid out the basic distinction between democracies and autoc-
racies (section 2.1), the next step consists in a further differentiation (section 
2.2.). A dichotomous distinction between autocracy and democracy is often too 
rudimentary for analyzing a wider spectrum of autocracies and democracies. 
While, on average, the level of democracy impacts positively on economic per-
formance, there are several democracies where the institutional design still 
demonstrates severe deficiencies, thus constraining economic performance. 
Likewise, there have been forms of autocratic regimes, which at least partially 
have been able to mimic the institutional advantages of democratic order. Thus, 
in order to study the differing economic impact of different autocratic regimes, 
one should distinguish autocracies along the above made two dimensions: their 
level of inclusiveness and their regulation of succession. 
Section three turns to the empirics of Mexican history and attempts to link 
different types of Mexican autocracy with the observed variance of economic 
performance. For this purpose, Mexican history throughout the last century is 
divided into four stages and then analyzed through the lens of the theoretical 
argument. 
2. Political Orders and Economic Development 
2.1 Autocracy, Democracy, and Development 
The potential impact of politics on economic performance has attracted increas-
ing attention of researchers from different social sciences. In this regard, cross-
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country comparisons have led to a relatively broad consensus: political institu-
tions – the rules that guide political interactions – rank very high among the 
fundamental factors, which explain differences in economic performance.2 
Differences with regard to the security of property rights and levels of corrup-
tion are crucial for explaining why some countries have prospered while others 
remained poor.3 Thus, political institutions have an important implication for 
poor societies because only if these countries achieve an improvement of po-
litical institutions they will be able to escape economic misery and realize their 
potential of catching up to rich countries (Keefer/Knack 1997).  
These insights, however, do not inform us about the economic effects of dif-
ferent political regimes that regulate political participation, access to power, or 
political succession. Economic policies implemented by political decision-
makers strongly effect the allocation of resources and the distribution of eco-
nomic privileges among societal groups. Unfortunately, even if most govern-
ments rhetorically claim to serve the encompassing interests of society, gov-
ernments often depend on specific groups, which expect something in return 
for their political support. Thus, politicians, who want to remain in power, will 
attempt to provide policies, which please their specific support groups and not 
necessarily the whole society.4 Consequently, if different political orders sys-
tematically differ with regard to the size and the access modalities of such 
coalitions, one should expect different economic outcomes. 
The most prominent debate within this strand of research is whether democ-
racy provokes an economic dividend compared to autocracy. In contrast to au-
tocratic order, democracy is generally defined along the concept of Polyarchy 
(Dahl 1971). Modern democracies are a form of representative government 
characterized by inclusive and participatory political competition. Core features 
of democracy are regularly held free and fair elections for the executive and/or 
legislative, freedom of the press and of association, as well as party competi-
tion. Surprisingly, however, many past studies have not identified a uniform 
direction from democracy to economic growth (Przeworski et al. 2000). Only 
recently did cross-country comparisons provide evidence that higher levels of 
democracy impact positively on measures of economic performance: such as 
economic productivity (Faust 2006, 2007) or the provision of education and 
other public goods necessary for sustained economic development (Lake/Baum 
2001; Baum/Lake 2003; Mesquita et al. 2003; Halperin et al. 2004). 
                                                 
2  In a broader sense, institutions are defined as the rules of political and economic markets 
that can reduce transaction costs and thus may contribute to a more efficient use of produc-
tive resources (North 1990). 
3  For empirical cross-country studies on the impact of political institutions on economic 
growth and economic productivity see, among others, Clague et al. 1996, Hall/Jones 1999, 
Olson et al. 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2001. 
4  This constellation gives rise to the tensions between individual and collective rationality. 
The economic policy chosen by a self-interested political leader to please his support 
groups does not necessarily reflect the collective interests of society. 
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In general, advocates of an economic dividend of democracy emphasize two 
closely interlinked features of democracy, which make this political order – on 
average – more conducive to broader measures of economic development. 
These features are 1) the competitive inclusiveness and 2) the regulation of 
political succession. 
Ad 1) Competitive inclusiveness: In order to secure the loyalty of their sup-
porters, political leaders generally choose between offering public or private 
goods.5 If their political survival depends on a relatively small coalition of 
societal support groups, they will tend to offer specific privileges (private 
goods) to their supporters. Instead, if a government depends on an encompass-
ing majority of society, it is rational for the government to offer non-exclu-
sionary public goods that reach broader segments of the population. Autocra-
cies, by definition, are characterized by exclusive distribution coalitions. By 
different degrees of repression, autocratic governments exclude large segments 
of the population from political decision-making and therefore can provide 
themselves and their narrow group of supporters with economic privileges. In 
contrast, democracies are characterized by mechanisms of inclusive political 
competition and, thus, are less able to systematically exclude the interests of 
large population segments from economic policy-making. In a democracy, the 
natural monopoly of the executive and the legislative is regulated by inclusive 
and competitive means (Faust 2007). 
These different features of autocracy and democracy have important eco-
nomic implications. Ceteris paribus, self-interested democratic governments 
will provide more public goods to the citizenry than autocracies, while the lat-
ter will disproportionately satisfy their smaller set of support groups with eco-
nomic privileges. Therefore, citizens of democracies are, on average, better 
equipped with public goods such as access to education, justice, or health care. 
Furthermore, competitive inclusiveness of democracies also leads to different 
growth trajectories. As autocratic governments tend to distribute comparably 
more economic privileges to their narrow coalition, their economic policies 
will be more competition adverse compared to those of democracies. Competi-
tion adverse policies, in turn, are unfavorable for economic productivity. Con-
sequently, while autocracies might achieve growth through resource mobiliza-
tion (factor accumulation), productivity growth will be higher in democracies 
than in autocracies (Faust 2007).6 In autocracies, a well-established small dis-
tribution coalition enriches itself at the cost of collective development. In con-
trast, the institutional setting of democracy substantially smoothens the tensions 
                                                 
5  The following arguments are closely related to Olson 1993 and Mesquita et al. 2003. 
6  Even those regimes in Asia, which often have achieved impressive overall growth rates 
during the last decades, have exhibited comparatively modest rates of productivity growth 
under authoritarian rule. Instead resource mobilization has been mainly responsible for 
overall growth in these countries (Krugman 1994; Young 2003). 
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between individual and collective rationality by increasing the responsiveness 
of decision-makers to the encompassing interests of society. 
Ad 2) Regulation of political succession: The second advantage of democ-
racy is its inherent succession mechanism through elections. Elections are 
therefore not only the core element of inclusive and competitive participation. 
Their regularity also secures this kind of inclusiveness by obstructing the 
emergence of narrower ruling coalition and constraining potential incentives of 
politicians to respond only to a small set of societal interest groups. Even if the 
leadership of the opposition through democratic elections substitutes a democ-
ratic government, the democratic regime itself continues to survive. Therefore, 
the electoral mechanism of political succession is an integral part of the logic 
of democratic order and provides a considerable amount of institutional secu-
rity. Even if different democratic governments will pursue different economic 
policies, different governments will nevertheless continue to be constrained by 
the survival of an institutional framework that drives their strategies more 
towards the encompassing interests of society.7 In contrast, because of the 
comparatively exclusive character of autocracy, such regimes face serious 
systemic challenges when confronted with the succession of leadership (Olson 
1993). While some autocratic regimes, especially dynasties, attempt to estab-
lish stable rules of political succession, the exclusiveness of autocracy nonethe-
less provokes an endogenous threat to regime stability (Merkel 1999: 63). 
Autocracies exclude and suppress the interests of the majority of the citizenry. 
Thus, leadership succession produces an additional amount of insecurity be-
cause it presents an opportunity for the excluded to overthrow the regime. 
The succession problem produces an additional challenge for prosperity in 
autocratically governed societies. First, economic policies are influenced by a 
government’s interest in overall economic growth. If equipped with a long-
term perspective, even autocratic coalitions have an interest in economic 
growth, because an absolute increase of wealth enables them to extract more 
economic privileges from the economy. Second, autocratic governments have 
more discretionary manœuvring space for orienting economic policies towards 
their own interest. Thus, if political succession in autocracies tends to be a 
risky process and threatens the survival of the regime, the autocratic coalition’s 
time horizon with regard to economic activities will be comparatively low 
during periods of succession. Increasing insecurity gives strong incentives for 
the autocratic coalition to maximize its wealth in the short run. Consequently, it 
will abstain from long term investments but instead increase the amount of 
discretionary, purely self-interested interventions in the economy (Olson 1993: 
571). Not surprisingly, the probability of economic downturn increases as a 
consequence of the unresolved challenge of political succession. In contrast, 
                                                 
7  For instance, even in Latin America, where democracies are still characterized by severe 
deficiencies, cross-country studies suggest that democratization led to a stronger orientation 
of politicians towards public good provision (Brown/Hunter 1999, 2004; Faust 2006). 
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the regime-coherent and institutionalized mechanism of political succession in 
democracies does not threaten the institutional essentials of democracy to the 
same extent as in autocracies. Therefore, the relatively moderate economic 
insecurity resulting from political succession in democracies will provoke only 
modest economic responses. 
2.2 Autocracies, Mimicry and Development 
On the one hand, the above made distinction between autocratic and democ-
ratic order and the deduction of the resulting economic consequences is fruitful 
to highlight fundamental differences in institutional design. On the other hand, 
reality is more complex than a dichotomous distinction. For instance, democra-
cies, too, are plagued by narrow distribution coalitions engaged in rent-seeking 
(Olson 1982), and electoral institutions can also set incentives for democratic 
governments to engage in collectively questionable economic measures  
(Persson/Tabellini 2003, 2004). Even more, not all democracies have the same 
level of institutional consolidation, and especially emerging democracies are 
often confronted with institutional volatility and a lack of democratic account-
ability, which provoke negative economic impacts.8 Nevertheless, the above 
made analytical distinction is fruitful to identify core features of different kinds 
of political orders that explain why increasing levels of democracy, on average, 
have positive consequences for economic productivity and the provision of 
other public goods. Furthermore, this dichotomous distinction helps to array the 
existing variance of democracies according to a set of theoretically deduced 
criteria, which help to explain the variance of economic growth and broader 
measures of prosperity among democracies. Moreover, if autocratic regimes 
also vary, more differentiated distinctions among existing democracies and 
autocracies help to explain the puzzle. On the one hand, higher levels of de-
mocracy produce an economic dividend. On the other hand, evidence from 
countries such as China, Indonesia or Mexico demonstrates that autocratic or-
der sometimes show periods of impressive economic development. 
In principle, there could be several explanations for this puzzle. First, the 
mere evidence of economic progress in an autocratic regime does not contra-
dict the argument that economic progress would have been even higher under 
democratic order. Second, if one considers regime type as an important but not 
determining factor of economic development, than there might have been other 
factors such as geography, population size or resource endowments, which 
have compensated the economic disadvantage of autocratic rule.9 Finally, the 
                                                 
8  For economic challenges of democratization see Haggard/Kaufman 1995, Faust 2002. On 
different types of democracy see Collier/Levitsky 1997, Croissant/Merkel 2004. 
9  Especially multivariate cross-country comparisons attempt to include the counterfactual 
argument and to control for potential effects of other factors on economic performance. 
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variance of economic success in autocratic regimes can be explained by institu-
tional differences under different kinds of autocratic rule. 
Unfortunately, many autocratic orders are characterized by the importance 
of informality and low transparency. These comparatively opaque mechanisms 
of autocratic rule make it more difficult and time consuming to identify chang-
es in rules and core actor constellations. Often, only in-depth historic analysis 
will provide the necessary information. Thus, exploring this latter alternative is 
a well-suited approach for historic analysis, focusing upon economic develop-
ment in one country over a longer period of time. If such a longer period is 
characterized by the existence of different kinds of autocratic regimes, the 
single case can be disaggregated into several sub-periods, thus allowing for a 
small-n comparison. 
The focus on inclusive political competition and mechanisms of succession 
offers an opportunity to further distinguish between autocracies.10 Following 
the analytical distinction between democracy and autocracy, a further dichoto-
mous differentiation between autocracies suggests that autocratic regimes 
based on a broader ruling coalition have incentives to mimicry certain features 
of democracy. Consequently, one can expect that such autocracies will eco-
nomically outperform those, which are based on smaller ruling coalitions. 
First, there are autocratic regimes based on a solid but very small distribu-
tion coalition. In many cases, a single political leader, who is supported by the 
military and a small amount of economic elites, leads these autocracies. In such 
regimes, strong personalized governance is the rule rather than the exception. 
Highly institutionalized forms of power sharing and control of leadership are 
rare, because a comparatively small coalition allows for policy-making without 
complex mechanisms of political regulation. If stable, such a coalition has an 
interest in overall economic growth because growth will maximize the overall 
resources, from which it can extract its economic privileges. 
However, since the support group of the regime is small, it is rational for the 
leader to provide well-targeted private rents instead of public goods. Therefore, 
economic growth under such narrow autocratic coalitions will be achieved by a 
comparatively high degree of capital accumulation. Furthermore, one would 
expect comparatively small improvements of human capital and only modest 
increases in economic productivity. Growth would be merely the result of the 
small ruling coalition’s stable grip on political power – achieved by relatively 
high degrees of political repression – and not by the incentives of leaders to 
provide public goods and productivity enhancing policies.  
While this type of autocracy potentially can achieve overall economic 
growth, its institutional setup will nevertheless contrast substantially with re-
gard to the mechanisms of democracy. This type of autocratic regime is con-
                                                 
10  In contrast to traditional real type oriented differentiations (Linz 2000, [1975]), the above 
made criteria offer a political economy perspective and a stronger deductive approach ori-
ented towards explaining the economic dynamics of different autocratic regimes. 
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fronted with a combination of challenges. Even if the small coalition’s growth 
strategy is successful, it will provoke a growing societal asymmetry between 
the small group of coalition members and the majority of the population. 
Therefore the probability increases, that the resulting problems of legitimacy 
will be condensed in times of political succession, if personalized leadership 
characterizes the regimes. 
Second, there are autocratic regimes, which resulted out of a broader elite 
settlement. In such cases, political leaders have to respect the interests of 
broader segments of society. While still being hierarchically organized and 
exclusive in contrast to democracy, these kinds of broader autocratic coalitions 
have an interest in crafting institutional mechanisms that constrain the discre-
tionary manœuvring space of one group. In fact, if a balance of power among 
coalition members exists, the broader the coalition, the more it will be engaged 
in crafting institutions that secure each coalition member’s influence on policy-
making. Under such circumstances, one can expect that the interest in power 
sharing arrangements will also include the challenge of succession and attempts 
to provide regulative solutions for that challenge. 
Consequently, some autocratic regimes will be able to mimic democratic 
mechanisms to a certain extent and provoke broader economic development 
(Mesquita/Downs 2005). On the one hand, such autocracies will still differ 
from democracies because the logic of organizing institutions is still based on 
vertical and hierarchical political organization. On the other hand, however, 
institutionalizing checks and balances among a broader set of coalition mem-
bers and regulating political succession show similarities to core mechanisms 
of representative democracy. If successful, these autocratic regimes will differ 
with regard to economic development from other forms of autocracy as the 
existence of a broader ruling coalition will set incentives for leaders to distrib-
ute benefits among broader segments of the population through cooptation or 
even increase the amount of public good provision. Furthermore, if equipped 
with institutionalized mechanisms of succession, short-term orientation of 
policy-making respectively insecurity among investors will be reduced. 
Not surprisingly, these autocratic regimes are mostly characterized by a 
dominant and well-institutionalized political party that organizes the inclusion 
of broader segments of society into the political process. As notified by Jason 
Brownlee in a recent study of authoritarian regimes (2007: 32), “through par-
ties, autocratic rulers draw on the support of a cohesive coalition while sup-
pressing advocates of representative governance.” As his empiric evidence 
suggests, among authoritarian regimes, those characterized by a dominant party 
are significantly less affected by breakdown than military regimes (Brownlee 
2007: 31). Still, even among single party regimes, party organization might 
respond differently to the size of the leading coalition. Thus, one should care-
fully distinguish between repressive and rather totalitarian single party regimes 
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led by a single leader and a very small ruling coalition and those which are 
based on a broader coalition, generally allowing limited political pluralism. 
3. What happened in Mexico? 
3.1 Overview  
In the following, Mexican history in the 20th century is divided into four “po-
litical” periods: first, the dictatorship under Porfirio Díaz; second, the Mexican 
revolution and its aftermath; third, the establishment of the one-party dominant 
regime from the late 1930s until the late 1960s; and fourth, its slow and gradual 
decline, which resulted in democratic elections in 1994 and the defeat of the 
PRI in the presidential race of 2000. 
Based on historic analysis, a distinction between those periods shows that 
the different regime characteristics of these four periods can be linked to the 
analytical distinction made in the previous section.11 On the one hand, none of 
these periods has been marked by representative democracy, even if some kind 
of political liberalization characterized the PRI regime between 1976 and the 
first democratic elections in 1994. On the other hand, autocratic regimes dif-
fered substantially in 20th century Mexico. 
1) Highly personalized leadership and a small and low-institutionalized rul-
ing coalition without a succession mechanism were key features of the Porfiri-
ato. The dictatorship in its first decades was able to expand the state monopoly 
to an unprecedented extend in independent Mexico. Nevertheless, the exclu-
sionary character and the failure to organize political succession led to increas-
ing political instability and finally to the breakdown of the regime.  
2) Political instability and relatively unsuccessful attempts of political entre-
preneurs to establish small-coalition-based autocracies characterized the period 
of the Mexican Revolution (1911-1917). Low levels of stability and the ab-
sence of an elite settlement still were attributes of political regimes in the pro-
longed aftermath of the Mexican revolution.  
3) From the early 1930s, leading elites started to institutionalize an elite set-
tlement, which nevertheless proofed to be successful only since the Cardenas 
government (1934-1940). The result of these attempts was a broader ruling 
coalition, where conflict regulation and a mechanism of succession were em-
bedded into the dominant and corporatist-style of the PRI. While still being an 
autocratic regime, the first phase of the PRI regime was more inclusive than the 
dictatorship during the Porfiriato.  
                                                 
11  Mexico is probably one of the best-studied developing countries. For different aspects of 
Mexican political order in the 20th century see, for example, Haber et al. 2003, Mols 1981, 
Lauth 1991, Centeno 1994, Knight 1986. 
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4) The gradual decline of the regime began in the late 1960s, when the re-
gime responded with repression to demands for democratic reforms. On the one 
hand, the regime turned to a mixture of gradual political liberalization and 
political cooptation. On the other hand, the political power slowly shifted from 
the PRI to the executive. In parallel, a narrowing of the ruling coalition oc-
curred within the executive that slowly erased the succession mechanism. 
Did these differences in autocratic order provoke different economic im-
pacts? Figure 1 gives a first impression of Mexican growth in the 20th century.12  
Fig. 1: GDP per capita in Mexico and the United States from 1900-1999 
      GDP per capita in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars.  
      Source: Hofmann 2000; Maddison 2003. 
 
Comparing the development of GDP per capita in Mexico and the United 
States during the 20th century shows that despite Mexico’s periodical growth 
experience, especially between 1940 until 1980, there was no process of catch-
ing up to its northern neighbor. Thus, it seems that Mexico did not achieve 
those conditions that allow for economic convergence between rich and poor 
countries. The differences between both countries during the last century with 
regard to the security of property rights and levels of democracy fit well with 
statistical cross-country evidence, which highlights the need for development 
promoting political institutions for economic catch-up. 
                                                 
12  For Mexico, figure 1 excludes the period 1911-1917 because no reliable overall growth 
estimates are available for the time of the Mexican revolution. 
0
10.000
20.000
30.000
40.000
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
USA
Mexico
 316
A closer look at economic growth in Mexico reveals substantial differences 
with regard to specific phases in the last century. Figure 2 shows overall and 
per capita growth in five-year-periods, again with the exception of the 1911-
1920. Partly impressive overall economic growth rates are substantially re-
duced when looking at per capita growth rates. Furthermore, the last years of 
the Porfiriato (1905-1910) are characterized by significantly lower growth 
rates than the years before. During the aftermath of the revolution growth rates 
were still substantially lower than during the 1935-1980 period, which was 
followed by a phase of economic crisis. Finally, the five years after the first 
democratic presidential election saw above average per capita growth rates. 
Fig. 2: GDP growth in Mexico 1900-1999 
    Average five-year growth rates based on International Geary-Khamis dollars.  
    Source: Hofmann 2000, Maddison 2003. 
 
To certain extend, this overview already supports the arguments made in the 
previous chapter. For a more detailed analysis, the next sections attempt to link 
autocratic order more carefully with economic performance. 
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3.2 The Porfiriato 
The regime of general Porfirio Díaz shaped Mexico over thirty years from 1876 
to 1911.13 Díaz’ regime was the first since independence able to extend the 
state’s reach to most of the Mexican territory. As such, the autocratic coalition 
not only brought a previously unknown political stability to the country but 
also gained access to the most important production factors of the Mexican 
economy. Díaz’ autocratic coalition was small and not institutionalized by a 
differentiated party structure. It consisted of the military, a small number of 
bureaucrats and economic elites, mainly from the financial sector, and a re-
duced number of other economic sectors (Haber et al. 2003: 42ff). Facilitated 
by the low level of socio-economic differentiation, the autocratic coalition was 
not confronted with well-organized economic groups.  
Given its territorial reach and its relative political stability, the economic 
policy of the regime focused on capital accumulation. Economic modernization 
under Díaz consisted mainly of larger investments in infrastructure, mining and 
in several light industries. The regime fostered the emergence of a financial 
sector responsible for organizing the large amount of capital necessary to sup-
ply the productive sectors. As Mexican elites lacked of sufficient own re-
sources, the regime relied on improving its relations with the United States and 
other foreign investors. Additionally, the regime continuously renegotiated its 
external debt in order to avoid massive capital outflows respectively to promote 
capital inflows (Aggarwal 1996: 175, 182-187). 
Partially impressive growth rates respectively the modernization of the pro-
ductive sector during the Porfiriato largely originated from a combination of 
two crucial factors : first, the improvement of the relations with the United 
States, which functioned as an investment source and an export market. As 
figure 3 demonstrates, the economic weight of the Foreign Direct Investment 
stock in the last years of the Porfiriato was substantially higher than in the rest 
of the century. Furthermore, the “discovery of oil in Mexico in 1901, along 
with its improving financial condition, encouraged foreign creditors and finan-
ciers to compete in loan offers to Mexico” (Aggarwal 1996: 186). Second, the 
emergence of a financial market (whose leading actors became an integral part 
of the autocratic regime) supplied domestic investments. As a result, economic 
modernization was mainly based on the exploitation of natural resources using 
cheap domestic labour, foreign technology and foreign capital to promote ex-
ports as well as to expand the country’s infrastructure network, especially rail-
roads. 
                                                 
13  With the exception of the 1880-1883 period, during which Díaz voluntarily stepped back 
from the presidency and a supporter of Díaz’ modernization strategy acted as president. 
Díaz, who continued to be the main political character behind the scenes, officially became 
re-elected and returned to office in 1884. 
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Fig. 3: Stock of Foreign Direct Investment as Percentage of GDP 
      Source: Twomey 2001: 35 
 
However, given the small autocratic coalition, the government had strong 
incentives to provide rents to its supporters instead of public goods to an en-
compassing majority of society. Markets in all dynamic sectors of the Mexican 
economy were highly cartelized, provided enormous privileges for insiders and 
obstructed the emergence of competition-based resource allocation (Hansen 
1971: 18). As Haber et al. note (2003: 44), the Díaz government “specified and 
protected property rights of a select group of asset holders and used the rents 
generated from this selective protection to subdue or seduce his political oppo-
nents”. As a consequence, living conditions became highly heterogeneous. 
Beyond the privileged ruling coalition, small businesses flourished in the 
urban areas of the northern and partially the central provinces of the country. 
Modernization came along with the emergence of an urban middle class con-
sisting of white-collar workers, artisans, and entrepreneurs. For urban citizens, 
property rights increased slightly but there were no institutionalized guarantees 
and political opposition was fiercely repressed by the regime. 
The rural population, however, was mostly excluded from economic mod-
ernization. The concentration of land not only erased traditional production and 
property right structures (ejidos) but also converted small peasants in land 
workers deprived of civil and political rights. Therefore, the rural peasantry 
bore most of the cost of a modernization strategy that was based on a narrow 
autocratic coalition.14 Still in 1885, the illiteracy rate amounted to roughly 
90%. In its last decade, the regime’s policies provoked a decline in urban em-
                                                 
14  Land concentration and cheap labour enabled agriculture and livestock exports. This latter 
dynamic was further promoted due to the exploitation of new areas, which were integrated 
into the economy by the emerging railroad networks. 
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ployment as mechanization proceeded. Overall, most of the country’s popula-
tion did not profit from Mexico’s growth under the Porfiriato.15 
Highly uneven distribution of wealth confronted the regime with decreasing 
legitimacy since the beginning of the 20th century. Signs of political instability 
appeared in 1904 but the regime still was able to respond with little cooptation 
and repression (Vásquez/Meyer 1985: 96). Nevertheless, especially the urban 
middle class increased its calls for political liberalization as freedom of press or 
freedom of assembly was non-existent and elections were continuously ma-
nipulated. Beyond, the regime became increasingly confronted with the prob-
lem of succession. Despite promises of political liberalization made in 1908, 
neither was the aging Díaz willing to hand over power nor was the ruling coali-
tion able to agree upon a potential successor (Mols 1981: 63; Blanquel 1995: 
121). In an environment of increasing insecurity, economic policies became 
short-term oriented. Even if provoked by financial turmoil in the U.S., the 
1907/1908 Mexican financial crisis reflected the weakness of a cartelized bank-
ing system dependent on capital inflows and further reduced political legiti-
macy. Regime collapse occurred finally when Díaz, despite of previous an-
nouncements, again campaigned for the presidency in 1910 and refused to 
allow a democratic election for the vice president. 
3.3 The Revolution and Its Aftermath 
The Mexican revolution (1910-1917) can be considered as a period of state 
erosion during which none of the major political groupings succeeded in estab-
lishing control over the state. Beyond the profiteers of the Díaz regime, a sec-
ond group, led by Francisco Madero, was primordially based on the middle 
class, interested in political liberalization and slight economic change. The 
third group, led by Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa, mainly consisted of the 
rural population interested in radical economic change and agrarian reforms. 
None of the groups was able to set up a stable regime, many of their leaders 
were assassinated, among them Madero, Zapata and later Villa.16  
Political order was partially re-established during the government of the 
northern general Venustiano Carranza in 1916 who defeated Zapata and Villa. 
Under his government, the Mexican constitution of 1917 was passed. This 
document presented a formal compromise of various factions in an attempt to 
prevent the dominance of one of the rivaling political groups. In this context, 
one important aspect was to prohibit re-election of presidents. It converted 
Mexico into a federal republic led by a president and a bicameral congress. 
                                                 
15  See also Bortz/Aguila 2006. In the absence of refined data on wealth distribution, a study 
on Mexican inductees’ height as a proxy-variable for broader well being comes to a similar 
conclusion. The height of Mexicans differed substantially between the upper and lower 
classes and this gap increased prior to the revolution (Moramay/Porras 2003). 
16  For an in-depth historical analysis of the Mexican revolution see Knight 1986. 
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Furthermore, the Mexican constitution restricted the influence of the church 
and formally provided an unprecedented amount of political and social rights to 
the Mexican citizenry, including the protection of indigenous communal land.  
While the passing of the constitution set a formal end to the revolution, po-
litical instability continued in the following years. Carranza was murdered in 
1920 and followed by presidents Alvaro Obregón (1920-24) and Plutarco Elias 
Calles (1924-28), whose governments successfully began to organize an elite 
settlement. Trade unions were brought under the control of the state, the army’s 
revolutionary generals were weakened, the power of the Catholic Church was 
reduced substantially and initial land reforms were promoted. 
Most importantly, in 1929, Calles founded the National Revolutionary Party 
and began to incorporate all organized sectors under the umbrella of this party. 
Thus, after successfully defeating respectively taming potential rivals of the 
emerging order, the Calles government began to institutionalize a corporatist 
structure designed to control the political system, to avoid violent conflict and 
to organize political succession. Yet, Calles remained the political leader even 
after one of his supporters was elected president. Thus, Calles himself became 
a threat for his own achievement: the institutionalization of a broader autocratic 
coalition. Political insecurity re-emerged before the 1934 presidential elections 
because his government showed augmenting signs of corruption, and increas-
ingly disregarded social demands. The regime began to consolidate, when the 
next president, Lázaro Cárdenas, not only amplified the social commitment of 
his government but also successfully sent Calles into exile. 
Not surprisingly, economic development during the Mexican revolution and 
its aftermath was seriously hampered by political instability. The ruling coali-
tions of the short-lived governments were relatively small and therefore con-
fronted overall development with similar challenges as during the Porfiriato. 
Additionally, political turmoil reduced incentives to invest and diminished time 
horizons of political leaders, who were often interested in quickly extracting 
rents for securing their own political survival. 
However, the revolution and its aftermath did not provoke a total collapse of 
the Mexican economy. Instead, the revolution affected different sectors in 
different ways. For instance, the international shortage of crude oil led to an 
unknown export boom in Mexico, which reached its peak in 1921 and then 
steadily declined until 1933 (Rubio 2006). The domestic condition for respond-
ing successfully to the increasing international demand in the midst of political 
turmoil is explained by the fact that the U.S. credibly signaled to Mexican 
politicians, that it would not tolerate the expropriation or destruction of U.S. 
investments in the Mexican oil and mining industry. Moreover, a high percent-
age of the state revenues originated from the oil sector, so incentives to kill the 
goose that laid the golden eggs were low (Haber et al. 2003: 200). In other 
sectors like banking and agriculture, political instability set more incentives for 
predations because those factors where perceived as an easy source for funding 
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military efforts. As politicians with short-time horizons have an incentive to 
take away what is left in the vault to finance their political survival, the finan-
cial sector suffered most during the revolution (Haber et al. 2003: 346).  
In sum, on the one hand, the differentiated analysis of Stephen Haber and 
his colleagues explains, why Mexico’s economy did not collapse during the 
revolutionary turmoil and some sectors even experienced remarkable develop-
ment. On the other hand, however, economic progress during the revolution 
and its aftermath remained substantially below the potential of the Mexican 
economy. Economic growth only began to speed up considerably in the 1930s 
with the emerging elite settlement under the Obregón and Calles governments. 
3.4 The Regime of the PRI, Part one 
During the Cárdenas presidency, the emerging elite settlement was consoli-
dated and caused political stability for the decades to come (Knight 1992). The 
elite settlement manifested itself in a centralized and corporatist political sys-
tem, which was mainly organized by the successor of the National Revolution-
ary party, the PRI, and an expanding state bureaucracy.17 
The PRI reflected the institutionalization of the elite settlement and incorpo-
rated most politically relevant factions that were excluded during the Porfiri-
ato. Thus, the ruling coalition became broader and more equilibrated. The party 
was initially divided into four and after the taming of the military into three 
sectors: the rural sector, the labor sector and popular sector, the latter a residual 
category including the interests of the middle classes and part of business.18 
Thus, the party functioned as an institutional guarantee for including additional 
societal interests in the policy-process (Mols 1981: 193f.). During the presi-
dency of Cárdenas a corporatist structure of the PRI was consolidated, that 
linked state and party to both peasant and the working class, and, if not neces-
sarily assuring that their interests would be presented, guaranteed that neither 
would mount an independent challenge to the regime (Centeno 1994: 7). 
In fact, during its first decades, the PRI attempted to organize as much po-
litical interests as possible and granted previously unknown political mobility 
for those who accepted the political predominance of the party. In the first 
decade of the regime, the PRI was on a par with the bureaucracy of the execu-
tive. While the latter had the task to design and implement concrete policies, 
the political party functioned as a hierarchical organization that had to manage 
the aggregation of societal interests. 
                                                 
17  The PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucionario) was transformed into the PRM (Partido de la 
Revolución Mexicana) in 1938 and in 1946 into the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Insti-
tucionalizado), the latter name already reflecting the institutionalization of the regime. 
18  For an overview see Mols 1981, for an analysis of the labor sector see Lauth 1991. 
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However, Mexico was governed autocratically. The regime did not allow for 
decentralized political competition in the form of free and fair elections, ob-
structed the formation of alternative political organizations, dominated the 
press and recurred to repression when opponents openly questioned its legiti-
macy. There was no guarantee for the rule of law and there was no division of 
powers between the executive, the legislative and the judicative. Still, a limited 
and well-organized level of political competition existed within the regime. 
Furthermore, limited political pluralism and alternative political parties were 
accepted as long as they presented no threat for regime stability. 
At the top of the political pyramid, the president presided the executive as 
well as the dominant party. His key function was not simply to rule in a top-
down manner but to carefully balance the interests of the different regime fac-
tions. Despite his supreme position, the president had the principal task to act 
as the nation’s most important conflict moderator. Furthermore, the regime 
entailed a mechanism of political succession that worked well for several dec-
ades. On the one hand, the prohibition of presidential re-election and the presi-
dent’s dependence on the party and the bureaucracy constrained the emergence 
of a personalized dictatorship. On the other hand, however, the president was 
allowed to choose his successor among a group of informally chosen candi-
dates, who were perceived as being politically capable to guarantee the elite 
settlement. Each president was able to shape the future by selecting his succes-
sor but then was confronted with declining influence. As such, the regime 
comprised an orderly mechanism of succession, which was carefully observed 
if not controlled by all regime factions (Sanderson 1983; Centeno 1994: 7, 53). 
In sum, the autocratic PRI regime in its first decades managed to mimic 
some important institutional advantages of democracy to certain extend and 
differed substantially from the dictatorship of the Porfiriato. The regime was 
based on broader coalition of societal interests; it attempted to institutionalize 
conflict management; it allowed limited political competition within its own 
structures; and, finally, it established a mechanism of political succession. 
This specific setting of autocracy provoked an economic pay-off. As figure 
2 illustrates, the 1940-1980 period was characterized by continuous economic 
growth. Additionally, figure 4 shows a comparatively high level of macroeco-
nomic stability between 1940 and 1970 (measured by the inflation rate). Fur-
thermore, existing measures of broader well being such as life expectancy, 
school enrolment, etc. demonstrate that not only the elites profited from 
growth.19 Not surprisingly, the economic strategy was more inward-oriented 
than during the Porfiriato. The focus on domestic markets and the application 
of import-substitution strategies together with the nationalization of key indus-
                                                 
19  Data for such measures from the 1950s onwards can be obtained at the World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) or at the United Nations Common Database (UNCDB). 
 323
tries coincided with a broader regime coalition that demanded increasing top-
down planning in order to satisfy the broadened ruling coalition.20 
Fig. 4: Inflation in Mexico, 1900-1999 
      Source: INEGI (Estadísticas Históricas), Banxico 
 
Yet, economic policy-making of the PRI regime also came along with the 
weaknesses of autocratic order. While newly integrated societal groups also 
profited from economic growth, high levels of income distribution remained 
and even increased as demonstrated by the GINI-index in table 1. 
Table 1: Income Distribution in Mexico: GINI Index, 1950-2000 
 1950 1957 1963 1975 1984 1989 1994 2000 
Gini 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.58 0.51 0.55 0.54 0.54 
 
Source: World Bank, Deininger/Squire Data Set 
 
Furthermore, despite of a broader ruling coalition, the vertical political inte-
gration seriously constrained the emergence of decentralized and competition-
oriented modes of resource allocation. Albeit slowly, the regime increasingly 
was confronted with institutional sclerosis as the differentiated interests of the 
emerging middle classes were difficult to integrate into the aggregation mecha-
nisms of the political party and the rural sector continuously lost influence in 
policy-making.21 Instead, the executive and the bureaucracy increasingly began 
                                                 
20  The nationalization of the oil industry in 1938 can be seen as a crucial step towards the 
“guided” capitalism Mexican style, which allowed the regime to craft economic policies 
more in accordance with regime stability than with economic efficiency. 
21  Since the land reforms during the Cárdenas presidency, the rural population was the seg-
ment of society that did profit less from the economic “miracle”. Nevertheless, through its 
party apparatus, the regime managed to mobilize rural masses in times of election and – at 
the rhetoric level – continuously recurred to the ideals of the revolution. 
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to dominate the regime and rent seeking and corruption steadily increased in 
favor of a smaller subset of the ruling coalition (Centeno 1994). This trend is 
also mirrored in the declining rates of economic productivity growth since the 
1950s and reflects the increasing weight of rent-seeking politics. 
Table 2: Total Factor Productivity Growth in Mexico, 1940-1994 
1940-1950 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-1994 
3.90% 2.04% 1.85% 0.80% -1.19% -0.42% 
  Source: Santaella 1998: 19 
 
Not surprisingly, the regime was confronted with augmenting discontent in 
the second half of the 1960s, which resulted in open protests of students in the 
run-up to the Olympic Games in 1968. The regime decision to repress students’ 
protests with force was the crucial turning point with regard to regime stability. 
3.5 The Regime of the PRI, Part two 
Luis Echeverría, elected president in 1971 was confronted with the challenge of 
growing discontent of the population and the demands for economic privileges 
by a narrowing coalition. Echeverría and his successor, Lopez Portillo, tempo-
rarily solved this problem by a mixture of increasing economic cooptation, 
controlled political liberalization and a further concentration of power within 
the executive at the cost of the party (Faust 2001: 71f). Growing discontent was 
countered with an expansion of the administration and growth was financed 
through external resource mobilization. The increase of the bureaucracy and 
state-owned enterprises represented an instrument of political and economic 
cooptation that aimed at integrating part of the regime opposition respectively 
urban working and middle classes into the regime structures (Pardo 1991: 82). 
These measures were primordially financed by external resources and came at 
the prize of declining macroeconomic stability. 
While foreign debt already augmented during the 1960s, massive debt in-
creases occurred during the 1970s (table 3). At the end of the Echeverría presi-
dency, the Mexican government was forced to negotiate debt rescheduling with 
the International Monetary Fund. Nevertheless, during the presidency of Lopez 
Portillo, the Mexican government further increased its external resource mobi-
lization respectively international debt. The latter development was possible 
because the Mexican government as well as international creditors calculated 
easy repayment from projected oil revenues. This optimism resulted from the 
combination of the international oil crisis and the huge Mexican reserves dis-
covered in 1976, which prolonged inefficient economic policies that were 
mainly driven by political considerations. Not surprisingly, a comparison of 
figure 2 and table 2 demonstrates that overall growth rates substantially dif-
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fered from productivity growth during the 1970s. Finally, this vulnerable 
growth strategy collapsed in 1981 with the deterioration of oil prices and Mex-
ico was confronted with a severe debt crisis. 
Table 3: External Debt, 1941-2000 
President Increase of external 
debt in %
External debt in 
% of GDP /
External debt in 
% of exports 
 During presidential 
period
Last year of 
presid. period
Last year of 
presid. period 
Avila Camacho (1941-46) -3 4.18 42.21 
Aleman Valdés (1947-52) 58.8 5.42 61.13 
Ruiz Cortines (1953-58) 108.8 7.59 112.54 
López Mateos (1959-64) 157.6 10.43 200.25 
Díaz Ordáz (1965-70) 107.3 11.99 330.55 
Echeverría Alvarez (1971-76) 359.8 35.32 536.18 
López Portillo (1977-82) 200.4 90.13 244.75 
De la Madrid (1983-88) 15.4 39.81 221.34 
Salinas de Gortari (1989-94)  25.8 18.95 140.33 
Zedillo Ponce de L. (1995-00) -19.3 11.55 43.10 
Source: Statistics of INEGI & Banxico 
 
In parallel to the increasingly volatile economic situation, a tension emerged 
between the growing influence of the executive and limited political pluralism. 
From the mid 1970s, different presidents recurred to carefully crafted electoral 
reforms. The latter augmented the political space for opposition parties while at 
the same time securing electoral majorities of the PRI (Nohlen 1993). Simulta-
neously, however, the executive and core bureaucratic entities, especially the 
planning ministry, increased their influence on policy-making.  
Along with the rise of a small group of technocrats came the reshuffle of the 
autocratic coalition, which consisted of the re-emerging marriage between the 
political and the business elite (Centeno/Maxfield 1992). Since the state dis-
posed of only limited resources to distribute among an enlarging number of in-
terest groups, the administration had to search for additional financial sources. 
The debt crisis and the augmenting pressure of international financial organiza-
tions accelerated the declining political weight of the more socialist-oriented 
party in comparison to an emerging distribution coalition between the execu-
tive and business (Centeno 1994). Especially the governments of de la Madrid 
(1983-1987) and Salinas (1989-1994) saw the necessity to build closer links to 
private business and engaged in more market-oriented reforms. Privatization 
and foreign economic liberalization substantially reduced the role of the state in 
the economy and were secured by international arrangements such as the 
GATT membership (1986) and the creation of NAFTA (1994). Thus, a narrow 
coalition of political and economic elites again attempted to finance Mexican 
development through export led growth and foreign investment. 
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However, the costs of this policy shift were unequally distributed among the 
population. The close links between political decision-makers and business 
often led to private monopolies and cartel building, which extracted huge rents 
from their privileged market status. Since the re-privatization of the banking 
sector, this sector again became a crucial player in the narrowed coalition  
(Centeno/Maxfield 1992; Kessler 1998).  
In contrast, organized labor and the rural population had to bear the costs of 
privatization and fiscal politics attempting to re-establish macroeconomic stabi-
lity. As a consequence, the traditional institutions of conflict management and 
the mechanism of political succession were erased. In 1988, when Miguel de la 
Madrid selected his successor Salinas out of the same pro-business circle as 
presidential candidate, a group of leftist dissidents abandoned the PRI. Their 
candidate was only hindered to win the elections by fraud. The weakened re-
gime refrained from repression because of the changing international context 
and a high level of internal polarization. Instead, Salinas further marginalized 
the party and begun to build up mechanisms of cooptation and social distribu-
tion directly linked to the executive. Nevertheless, regime erosion continued. 
Growing discontent of the rural population led to an insurgence in the rural 
state of Chiapas as the most significant sign against the government’s market-
oriented policies. Increasing levels of unorganized corruption reflected the 
short-time horizons of economic and political actors (Morris 1999) and, finally, 
the short-term oriented currency policy resulted in a financial crisis, which de 
facto put an end to the regime. While the PRI still could win the 1994 elections 
amidst economic and political stability, president Ernesto Zedillo not only had 
to engage in serious political reforms but also had to accept an increasing 
weakness of the PRI regime, which resulted in the regime change of 2000.  
In sum, the gradual narrowing of the autocratic ruling coalition did not only 
lead to an unequal distribution of costs and rents from economic reforms. The 
resulting erosion of the mechanism of political succession also led to increasing 
political and economic instability, which finally put an end to one of the most 
long-living autocratic regimes of the 20th century. 
4. Conclusion 
Even if democracies produce an economic dividend in comparison to autocra-
cies, all autocracies are not the same. Given this background, the article has 
attempted to provide an explanation of different economic performance under 
different autocratic settings. Most importantly, autocracies based on a broader 
coalition and those equipped with a stable mechanism of succession partly 
mimic the institutional set up of democracies. Therefore these autocracies show 
disproportional high levels of economic performance in comparison to other 
forms of autocratic order. Evidence from 20th century Mexico supports this 
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argument. Dividing 20th century Mexican history in four periods of different 
kinds of autocratic rule shows, how the size of the autocratic coalition and the 
existence of a mechanism for political succession affect economic outcomes. 
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